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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Resch, a driver for Krapf’s Coaches, Inc. 
(“KCI”), filed this collective action on behalf of himself and 
thirty-three other KCI drivers (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 
seeking unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938 (“FLSA”) and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act 
of 1968 (“PMWA”).  Because Plaintiffs fall within the 
“Motor Carrier Act exemption” to these statutes’ overtime 
provisions, the District Court correctly granted summary 






 KCI is a motor coach company based in West Chester, 
Pennsylvania, and has a Transit Division that provides bus 
and shuttle services on set routes.  Since 2009, KCI has 
operated thirty-two such routes, four of which cross state 
lines.  From 2009 through 2012, the share of total Transit 
Division revenue generated by interstate routes fluctuated 
between 1.0% and 9.7%.   
 
KCI employs between thirty-six and sixty-two drivers 
in a given month and trains its drivers on multiple interstate 
and intrastate routes.  Plaintiffs concede that KCI retains the 
discretion to assign a driver to any route on which he has 
been trained, including interstate routes, and to discipline a 
driver who refuses to drive a route as assigned.   
 
Because KCI is a “common carrier by motor vehicle” 
authorized to engage in interstate commerce, it is subject to 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) 
regulations.1  JA 330a.  Accordingly, KCI possesses a U.S. 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) registration number, 
requires that each driver possess a Commercial Driver 
License (“CDL”), maintains a “Driver Qualification File” for 
each driver that includes FMCSA-required documentation, 
and must submit to DOT audits to ensure its compliance with 
FMCSA regulations.  KCI also provides each driver with a 
“Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations Pocketbook” 
                                              
1 The FMCSA is an administration within the U.S. 
Department of Transportation responsible for regulating 
commercial motor carriers.  See 49 U.S.C. § 113.  
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detailing the driver’s responsibilities under DOT regulations, 
JA 81a, as well as a separate KCI Handbook making clear 
that they “are expected to meet” FMCSA regulations.  JA 
77a. 
 
Plaintiffs were Transit Division drivers who, at some 
point during the relevant time period, worked more than forty 
hours in a week without receiving overtime pay.  Of the 
13,956 total “trips” Plaintiffs drove, 178 (or 1.3%) required 
them to cross state lines.  Sixteen plaintiffs never crossed 
state lines, eight crossed state lines only one time, and five 
crossed state lines fewer than five times.2   
 
Resch brought this collective action under the FLSA 
and PMWA to recover unpaid overtime.  The District Court 
granted his request to conditionally certify a class of 
“individuals who were employed by defendant as Transit 
Route drivers who worked over 40 hours during any 
workweek within the past three years,” JA 49a, and thereafter 
granted KCI’s summary judgment motion, holding that 
Plaintiffs are ineligible for overtime under the Motor Carrier 
Act exemption to the FLSA and PMWA.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(b)(1); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 333.105(b)(7).  
Plaintiffs appeal.   
   
II3 
                                              
 2 The remaining five plaintiffs drove interstate 58 
(3.1%), 43 (16.5%), 25 (4.4%), 16 (37.2%), and 11 (6.4%) 
times, respectively.  JA 136a.  
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise jurisdiction under 





 This appeal requires consideration of two statutes: the 
FLSA and the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (the “MCA”).4  The 
FLSA “requires employers to pay overtime compensation to 
employees who work more than forty hours per week, unless 
one or another of certain exemptions applies.”  Packard v. 
Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2005); 29 
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Congress enacted the FLSA “to protect 
all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive 
working hours” and to ensure that covered employees “would 
receive a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”  Parker v. 
NutriSystem, Inc., 620 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 
Congress enacted the MCA in response to a “wide 
scope of [] problems” in the motor carrier industry and “to 
adjust a new and growing transportation service to the needs 
of the public.”  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 
                                                                                                     
judgment is plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A disputed issue is 
“genuine” only “if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on 
which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”  
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the 
non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 
418 F.3d 265, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 4 The parties agree that identical principles govern 
Plaintiffs’ PMWA claim.   
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U.S. 534, 538 & 542 (1940).  The MCA “vest[s] in the [DOT] 
power to establish reasonable requirements with respect to 
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees 
and safety of operation and equipment of common and 
contract carriers by motor vehicle.”5  Levinson v. Spector 
Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 658 (1947).  The MCA’s 
requirements in this area are “intended to prevent accidents 
due to fatigue, without regard to consideration of adequacy of 
compensation.”  Starrett v. Bruce, 391 F.2d 320, 323 (10th 
Cir. 1968). 
 
 At issue is the MCA exemption that removes from the 
FLSA’s overtime protections “any employee with respect to 
whom the Secretary of Transportation has [the] power to 
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service 
pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49” of the 
MCA.  29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).  Section 31502(a)(1) applies to 
transportation “described in” § 13501, which in turn gives the 
DOT jurisdiction “over transportation by motor carrier . . . to 
the extent that passengers, property, or both, are transported 
by motor carrier . . . between a place in . . . a State and a place 
in another State.”  49 U.S.C. § 13501.  Through the MCA 
exemption, Congress has “prohibited the overlapping of . . . 
jurisdiction” between the U.S. Department of Labor and the 
DOT regarding “maximum hours of service.”  Levinson, 330 
U.S. at 661; see also Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 
U.S. 44, 48 (1943) (because it enacted the MCA before the 
FLSA, Congress apparently relied on the MCA to “work out 
                                              
 5 In 1966, the DOT assumed the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s [ICC] authority to regulate motor vehicle 
carriers.  Moore v. Universal Coordinators, Inc., 423 F.2d 96, 
97 n.1 (3d Cir. 1970).     
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satisfactory adjustments for employees charged with the 
safety of operations” in the transportation industry); 
McMaster v. E. Armored Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 167, 171 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (recognizing that the MCA “establish[es] a strict 
separation between the Secretary of Transportation’s 
jurisdiction and the ambit of the [FLSA’s] overtime 
guarantee”).   
 
 Two considerations dictate whether the MCA 
exemption applies: the class of the employer and the class of 
work the employees perform.  See 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a).  
Specifically, the MCA exemption applies if the employer is a 
carrier subject to the DOT’s jurisdiction and the employee is 
a member of a class of employees that “engage[s] in activities 
of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of 
motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of 
passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce 
within the meaning of the [MCA].”  Id.  In determining 
whether the exemption applies, we are mindful of the FLSA’s 
broad remedial purposes, and “that exemptions from the 
FLSA are construed narrowly[] against the employer,” with 
the employer bearing the burden to prove “plainly and 
unmistakably” that its employees are exempt.  Packard, 418 




The parties agree that KCI is a “motor carrier” subject 
                                              
6 Whether employees’ “particular activities excluded 
them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of 
law.”  Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 
714 (1986).      
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to the DOT’s jurisdiction, thus satisfying the first 
requirement.  We must therefore examine whether 
Plaintiffs—many of whom rarely or never crossed state 
lines—satisfy the second requirement by being a member of a 
class of employees engaging “in activities of a character 
directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in 
the transportation . . . of passengers or property” in interstate 
commerce.  29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a).  The District Court 
answered yes to this question based primarily on Morris v. 
McComb, 332 U.S. 422 (1947).   
 
In Morris, the Supreme Court addressed whether a 
group of truck drivers and mechanics employed by a Detroit-
based common carrier fell within the MCA exemption.  Only 
3.65% of the truck drivers’ trips were interstate, and the 
employer assigned such trips to the truck drivers “generally 
throughout the year” and “in the normal operation of [its] 
business.”  Morris, 332 U.S. at 433.  All of the truck drivers 
“shared indiscriminately” in the interstate trips, which were 
“mingled with the performance of other like driving services 
[they] rendered.”  Id.  Of the employer’s forty-three truck 
drivers: “every driver[] except two[] made at least one” 
interstate trip; the average truck driver made sixteen interstate 
trips; and the only two truck drivers who did not drive 
interstate had been employed “for only about one-half the 
year and that was during the months when the trips in 
interstate commerce were . . . less frequent.”  Id.   
 
The Supreme Court held that the DOT’s predecessor, 
the ICC, had jurisdiction to regulate all forty-three drivers—
even those who never drove interstate—and that none of the 
drivers were entitled to overtime under the FLSA.  See id. at 
434–36.  “From the point of view of safety in interstate 
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commerce,” the Supreme Court reasoned, the case would be 
the same “if each [of the employer’s] driver[s] drove 4% of 
his driving time each day in interstate commerce,” as there 
would be “the same essential need for the [ICC’s] 
establishment of reasonable requirements with respect to 
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees.”  
Id. at 434; see also Starrett, 391 F.2d at 323 (observing that 
“it is not the amount of time an employee spends in work 
affecting [interstate] safety, rather it is what he may do in the 
time thus spent, whether it be large or small, that determines 
the effect on safety”). 
 
Applicable regulations echo the Morris Court’s focus 
on the “class of work” performed by the employees 
occupying the same position, 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a), and the 
likelihood of the employer distributing those duties among 
the employees in question:  
 
As a general rule, if the bona fide duties of the 
job performed by the employee are in fact such 
that he is (or . . . is likely to be) called upon in 
the ordinary course of his work to perform, 
either regularly or from time to time, safety-
affecting activities of [a driver, driver’s helper, 
loader, or mechanic], he comes within the 
exemption in all workweeks when he is 
employed at such job.  This general rule 
assumes that the activities involved in the 
continuing duties of the job in all such 
workweeks will include activities which have 
been determined to affect directly the safety of 
operation of motor vehicles on the public 
highways in transportation in interstate 
10 
 
commerce.  Where this is the case, the rule 
applies regardless of the proportion of the 
employee’s time or of his activities which is 
actually devoted to such safety-affecting work 
in the particular workweek, and the exemption 
will be applicable even in a workweek when the 
employee happens to perform no work directly 
affecting “safety of operation.” 
 
29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3); see also Application of the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,902–02, 
37,903 (July 23, 1981) (“DOT Notice”) (“a driver will remain 
under the [DOT’s] jurisdiction . . . for as long as the driver is 
in a position to be called upon to drive in interstate commerce 
as part of the driver’s regular duties.”).  The DOT has 
jurisdiction “even if the driver has not personally driven in 
interstate commerce if, because of company policy and 
activity, the driver could reasonably be expected to do 
interstate driving.”  DOT Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. at 37,903 
(citing Morris, 332 U.S. 422).  Moreover, whether an 
employee “engage[s] in activities of a character directly 
affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles” in 
interstate commerce, 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a), depends “neither 
[on] the name given to his position nor that given to the work 
that he does,” id. § 782.2(b)(2) (citing Pyramid Motor Freight 
Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 707 (1947)).  Put simply, it is 
“the character of the activities rather than the proportion of 
either the employee’s time or of his activities” that controls.  
Levinson, 330 U.S. at 674.7   
                                              
 7 Because the inquiry focuses on what the class of 
employees could have reasonably been expected to do, the 




 “On the other hand, where the continuing duties of the 
employee’s job have no substantial direct effect on such 
safety of operation or where such safety-affecting activities 
are so trivial, casual, and insignificant as to be de minimis, 
the exemption will not apply to [the employee] in any 
workweek so long as there is no change in his duties.”  29 
C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3) (citing Pyramid, 330 U.S. at 707–08).  
The DOT thus “has authority over drivers only where the 
employees regularly travel interstate or reasonably are 
expected to do interstate driving.”  DOT Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 
at 37,903.   
 
Therefore, the relevant inquiry here is whether 
Plaintiffs reasonably could have expected to drive interstate, 
which we answer by “look[ing] at,” among other things, 
“whether the carrier (employer) does any interstate work,” 
“assigns drivers randomly to that driving,” and maintains a 
“company policy and activity” of interstate driving.  Id. 
(citing Morris, 332 U.S. 422).  The undisputed evidence 
establishes that, during the relevant time period, 6.9% of all 
trips drivers took were interstate, as much as 9.7% of the 
Transit division’s annual revenues derived from interstate 
routes, and KCI always operated at least one interstate route 
per month.  With regard to distribution of interstate routes, 
KCI had a “company policy” of training its drivers on as 
many routes as possible, retaining discretion to assign drivers 
to drive either interstate or intrastate routes—at any time—on 
which they had been trained, and disciplining any driver who 
refused.  See 46 Fed. Reg. at 37,903.  Given this evidence, the 
                                                                                                     
an “individualized analysis” of the “actual employment 
circumstances” of each Plaintiff.   
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District Court properly found no genuine dispute of material 
fact regarding whether Plaintiffs reasonably could have 
expected to drive interstate.  Friedrich v. U.S. Computer 
Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 
Further, unrefuted evidence reflects KCI’s adherence 
to federal regulations regarding the drivers.  For instance, 
KCI requires that each driver possess a valid CDL, comply 
with FMCSA drug testing requirements, submit to regular 
DOT physical examinations, and provide a pre-employment 
“Safety Performance History Record.”  App. 77a.  KCI also 
maintains DOT-required “Driver Qualification Files” for all 
drivers, App. 77a, which the FMCSA audits for compliance 
on a recurring basis.  KCI also issues all drivers a “KCI 
Handbook” advising them of KCI’s expectation that they 
meet these requirements, App. 77a, as well as a separate 
“Pocketbook” detailing the FMCSA regulations.  Since 2012, 
KCI has also required all drivers to complete a “Self 
Certification Form” wherein they check a box describing 
themselves as “NI-Non-Excepted Interstate Transportation: 
Interstate Drivers Who are Subject to the Federal Physical 
Qualifications and Examination Regulations.”  App. 80a.  
This recognition on the part of the drivers, together with 
evidence of KCI’s efforts to comply with DOT regulations—
which in large part consist of safety measures imposed on, 
and communicated directly to, the drivers— reinforce the 
drivers’ reasonable expectation of driving in interstate 
commerce.  See, e.g., Songer v. Dillon Res., Inc., 618 F.3d 
467, 469–70 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that truck drivers fell 
within MCA exemption where employer required them each 
to hold “a valid Class A commercial driver[’s] license and 
meet the driver qualification requirements of” the FMCSA, 
and issued them the Pocketbook containing “a compilation of 
13 
 
relevant regulatory information”).  Because KCI is an 
employer under the jurisdiction of the DOT and Plaintiffs are 
members of a class of employees who could reasonably be 
expected to drive interstate routes as part of their duties, the 
MCA exemption to the FLSA applies and Plaintiffs are 




Lastly, we reject Plaintiffs’ attempted reliance on the 
de minimis exception.  See 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3) (noting 
that the MCA exemption does not apply where the “safety-
affecting activities” of the employee’s “continuing duties” 
“are so trivial, casual, and insignificant as to be de minimis” 
(citing Pyramid, 330 U.S. at 707–08)).  Although the 
Supreme Court “has recognized a de minimis exception to the 
application of the MCA,” we have noted that “[a] number of 
courts have held that drivers should seldom, if ever, fall 
within [it].”  Friedrich, 974 F.2d at 416, 417 n.10 (citing 
cases); see also Crooker v. Sexton Motors, Inc., 469 F.2d 206, 
210 (1st Cir. 1972) (“The activities of one who drives in 
interstate commerce, however frequently or infrequently, are 
not trivial.”).  Indeed, the DOT has recognized courts’ 
resistance to applying this exception to drivers.  DOT Notice, 
46 Fed. Reg. at 37,903 (“The courts that have applied this 
principle find that it should seldom, if ever, be applied to 
drivers because of the direct effect of driving on the safety of 
motor vehicle operations.”).  “This is because the driver’s 
work more obviously and dramatically affects the safety of 
operation of the carrier during every moment that he is 
driving than does the work of the loader who loaded the 
freight which the driver is transporting.”  Levinson, 330 U.S. 




 The only binding authority regarding the de minimis 
exception to which Plaintiffs direct us concerns employees 
engaged in “the mere handling of freight at a terminal[] 
before or after loading” such that none of their activities 
affected “the safety of operation of motor vehicles” in 
interstate commerce so as to “come within the kind of 
‘loading’” contemplated under the MCA.  Pyramid, 330 U.S. 
at 708; see also, e.g., Reich v. Am. Driver Serv., Inc., 33 F.3d 
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding where 
there was no evidence at all that company engaged in 
interstate commerce during relevant time frame and expressly 
distinguishing “claims of jurisdiction over a motor carrier’s 
drivers who have not driven in interstate commerce when 
there is evidence that other drivers employed by the motor 
carrier have driven in interstate commerce”).  Other cases 
“suggest that a company’s interstate business is de minimis if 
it constitutes less than one percent of the overall trips taken 
by the company,” Walters v. Am. Coach Lines of Miami, 
Inc., 575 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009), circumstances not 
present here, see also id. (finding “no cases” applying the de 
minimis exception to an employer that “has the appropriate 
federal licensing and [where] there is undisputed proof of 
some transportation that crosses state lines”).  Given the 
undisputed facts concerning KCI’s interstate operations, 
which accounted for 1% to 9.7% of its Transit Division’s 
revenue, and Plaintiffs’ occupation, we decline to apply the 




 Thus, we will affirm the orders of the District Court. 
